We show in this paper that the AGM postulates are too weak to ensure the rational preservation of conditional beliefs during belief revision, thus permitting improper responses to sequences of obserwtions. We remedy this weakness by augmenting the AGM system with four additional postulates, which are sound relative to a qualitative version of probabilistic conditioning. Finally, we establish a model-based representation theorem which characterizes the augmented system of postulates and constrains, in turns, the way in which entrenchment orderings may be transformed under iterated belief revisions.
Introduction
The AGM postulates are perhaps the best known formalization of coherence in the process of belief revision [1] . The major emphasis of these postulates is the principle of minimal belief change, that is, the need to preserve as much of earlier beliefs as possible and to add only those beliefs that are absolutely compelled by the revision specified. But despite this emphasis on preserving propositional beliefs, we show in this paper that the AGM postulates are too weak to ensure plausible preservation of conditional beliefs, that is, beliefs that one is prepared to adopt conditioned on future observations. Conditional beliefs constitute an important component of one's epistemic state because they govern how beliefs should change in response to sequences of observations. The AGM theory is expressed as a set of one-step postulates which tell us what properties the next state of belief ought to have, given the current beliefs and the current evidence. However, the language of one-step postulates is not rich enough to regulate sequential revisions because such a language deals only with transformation of beliefs and not with transformation of epistemic states. An agent's epistemic state contains not merely what the agent believes currently but also an encoding of how the agent would modify his/her beliefs given any hypothetical evidence, that is, conditional beliefs.
In fact, a central result of the AGM theory states that the postulates are equivalent to the existence of a total pre-order on all propositions according to their degree of epistemic entrenchment such that belief revisions always retain more entrenched propositions in preference to less entrenched ones. But this ordering, which carries the information necessary for belief revision, is not represented in the language of one-step postulates, hence, the postulates cannot regulate how the ordering transforms during belief revision.
Since the relative entrenchment among hypothetical beliefs is crucial for distinguishing future beliefs from future disbeliefs, the preservation of this relative entrenchment in accordance with the minimalchange principle is as important as the preservation of beliefs themselves. Moreover, since the information content of this relative entrenchment is equivalent to that of conditional beliefs, the preservation of the former requires postulates about the latter, namely, two-step postulates about the revision of conditional beliefs.
The over permissiveness of the AGM postulates relative to changes in conditional beliefs has also been noted by Boutilier who suggested a belief revision operator, called natural revision, which provably preserves as many conditional beliefs as the AGM postulates would permit [2] . We show in this paper, however, that this strategy of minimizing changes in conditional beliefs is an excessive remedy to the AGM weakness and leads to counterintuitive results. As it turns out, if one insists on preserving all conditional beliefs permitted by AGM, then one is forced to retract some unconditional beliefs that ought to be preserved. The solution we suggest for preserving conditional beliefs is more cautious. We show that conditional beliefs can be classified formally and succinctly into two distinct categories; those that may destabilize unconditional beliefs if preserved, and those that may not. We then insist on preserving only the second category of conditional beliefs, and we do this by augmenting the AGM postulates with additional postulates. 1 This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review the AGM proposal and present a number of scenarios that are consistent with the AGM postulates and yet exhibit counterintuitive growth or shrinkage of conditional beliefs. Next, we analyze the minimal-change principle of conditional beliefs in Section 3. Based on this analysis, we augment the AGM postulates in Section 4 by four additional postulates that stabilize conditional beliefs --hence, regulating iterated revisions --and then extend the representation theorem of Katsuno and Mendelzon to cover the newly proposed postulates. We then show in Section 5 that the new postulates are sound with respect to a qualitative version of Jeffrey's Rule of probabilistic conditioning. In Section 6, we provide further insights behind the choice of our postulates and then conclude in Section 7 by discussing current and future related work. Proofs of theorems are delegated to Appendix B.
Belief Revision
Belief revision is the process of changing a state of belief to accommodate evidence that is possibly inconsistent with existing beliefs. Alchourron, Gardenfors, and Makinson [1, 4] have proposed a number of postulates to govern the process of belief revision. We now present these postulates, following the presentation of Katsuno and Mendelzon [7] , which restricts a state of belief to a propositional formula.
Given a state of belief ¢, art acquired belief (also called evidence) #, the notation ¢ o # is used to denote the new state of belief that results from revising ¢ with #. The AGM postulates can then be viewed as constraints on the revision operator o: 1The postulates we propose are inspired by a method for belief change suggested by Wolfgang Spohn [8, 9] and further studied by Mois~s Goldszmidt [5, 6] .
Katsuno and Mendelzon [7] have shown that a revision operator satisfies the AGM postulates precisely when there exists a "faithful assignment" that maps each state of belief ~/, to a total pre-order <¢ on worlds ~ such that Mods(,~ o p) = min(Mods(#), _<~).
In the remainder of this section, we shall consider a number of revision operators that conform to the AGM postulates but lead to the counterintuitive shrinkage or growth of conditional beliefs. But first, the following definition.
Definition 1 A state of belief ¢ accepts a conditional sentence fllo~ precisely when the proposition fl is accepted by the revision of ¢ with o# that is, ¢ o o~ ~ ft.
Our first scenario shows that an agent consistent with the AGM postulates may give up a conditional belief unjustifiably. Suppose that we see a strange new animal X at a distance, and it appears to be barking like a dog, so we conclude that X is not a bird, and that X does not fly. Still, in the event that X turns out to be a bird, we are prepared to change our mind and conclude that X flies. Observing the animal closely, we realize that it actually can fly. The question now is whether we should retain our willingness to believe that X flies in case X turns out to be a bird after all. We submit that it would be strange to give up this conditional belief merely because we happened to observe that X can fly. Yet, we provide later an AGM-compatible revision operator o that permits such behavior The example we just considered involves an agent that gives up a conditional belief unjustifiably, while remaining consistent with the AGM postulates. Our next example shows that an agent consistent with the AGM postulates may acquire a conditional belief unjustifiably. Specifically, we are introduced to a lady X who sounds smart and looks rich, so we believe that X is smart and X is rich. Moreover, since we profess to no prejudice, we also maintain that X is smart even if found to be poor and, conversely, X is rich even if found to be not smart. Now, we obtain some evidence that X is in fact not smart and we remain of course convinced that X is rich. Still, it would be strange for us to say, "If the evidence turns out false, and X turns out smart after all, we would no longer believe that X is rich." If we currently believe X is smart and rich, then evidence first refuting then supporting that X is smart should not in 2An assignment is faithful when Here, wl <¢ w2 precisely when wa <,p w2 and w2 ~ wl.
aWe are using the same revision operator to accommodate different pieces of evidence in this and further examples. Some may argue, however, that the AGM theory does not sanction any form of iterated revisions, or, more specifically, that it does not propose using the same revision operator for handling iterated revisions. Our examples, however, are applicable even if one uses different revision operators to accommodate different pieces of evidence.
any way change our opinion about X being rich. Strangely, the AGM postulates do permit such a change of opinion. We will provide later an AGM-compatible revision operator o such that g, =_ smart A rich, g, o -rich _= smart A --,rich, g,o -~smart ~ -smart A rich, and (~b o ~smart) 
The common feature permitting us to construct these examples is that while the AGM postulates constrain what revisions are permissible from a given state of belief ¢, under different propositions #, they, in principle, do not constrain how revisions must cohere when starting from different belief states. This is seen more clearly from the Katsuno and Mendelzon representation theorem [7] , where the order <¢ does not constrain the order _<¢ou except trivially. 4
Minimizing Changes in Conditional Beliefs
The examples we presented in the previous section show that the AGM postulates are too weak to regulate changes in conditional beliefs, thus permitting improper responses to sequences of observations. To address this weakness, we shall propose in Section 4 four additional postulates that stabilize changes in conditional beliefs and, hence, provide new criteria for testing the coherence of iterated belief revision.
One of the most subtle issues relating to our postulates is identifying those changes in conditional beliefs that must be minimized. For example, if we were to opt for a radical strategy of change minimization, then adding Postulate (CB) to the AGM postulates will suffice because it guarantees that conditional beliefs are preserved as much as the AGM postulates permit:
However, such a radical strategy would be excessive. We will first discuss the reason why Postulate (CB) minimizes changes in conditional beliefs and then show why it leads to counterintuitive results.
Absolute Minimization
Given Definition 1 and the representation theorem of Katsuno and Mendelzon, the state of belief ,¢ accepts the conditional/31a precisely when
min( Mods( a), _<¢ ) _C Mods(/3),
where _<¢ is the pre-order assigned to sentence ~/, by the revision operator o. Therefore, the pre-order ~¢ encodes the conditional beliefs accepted by ¢ and, similarly, the pre-order _<¢ou encodes the conditional beliefs accepted by ¢ o #. Hence, one can minimize changes in conditional beliefs after revising with # by making the pre-orders _<~ and _<¢ou as similar as possible, which is exactly what Postulate (CB) does:
Theorem 1 Given Postulates (R1)-(R6), Postulate (CB) is equivalent to the following:
(CBR) /f wl,W2 ~ -~(r,o#), then wx <¢ w2 iff wl _<¢o, w2.
That is, according to Postulate (CB), the order imposed by -<¢ou on two worlds in Mods (~(~l,o#) ) should be the same as that imposed on them by <¢. Note also that the order imposed by -<¢ou on other types of worlds is determined by the AGM postulates. Specifically, the faithfulness of -<Oou ensures that:
4The orders <¢ and _<¢ou are constrained by the requirement that each must be faithful. Therefore, once the total pre-order <¢ is known, Postulate (CB) together with the AGM postulates determine the total pre-order _<¢o~ completely.
3.2
Is Absolute Minimization Desirable?
Absolute minimization of changes in conditional beliefs is due to Boutilier who suggested minimizing these changes as much as the AGM postulates permit [2] . For this purpose, Boutilier proposed a method for belief revision, called natural revision, which fully achieves the above property. Boutiher observed that the conditional beliefs accepted by a state of belief g, are encoded in the pre-order <¢. Therefore, Boutilier suggested that the pre-order _<¢o~ be as similar to <~ as the AGM postulates permit, thus making the conditionals accepted by g, o # as similar to those accepted by ¢ as possible. In fact, Condition (CBR) is effectively Boutilier's definition of natural revision, and Postulate (CB) is a property that Boutilier has proven about his method of revision [2] . Although Postulate (CB) rules out the counterintuitive revision scenarios discussed Section 2, the Postulate is somewhat of an overkill because it does compromise the stability of unconditional beliefs. In particular, the postulate says that accommodating an evidence a should totally wash out a previous evidence # whenever # contradicts c~ in the light of ~b. But this does not always constitute enough grounds for evidence a to undermine an earlier evidence tt because the source of contradiction may lie with g, not with #.
Suppose, for example, that we encounter a strange new animal and it appears to be a bird, so we believe the animal is a bird. As it comes closer to our hiding place, we see clearly that the animal is red, so we believe that it is a red bird. To remove further doubts about the animal birdness, we call in a bird expert who takes it for examination and concludes that it is not really a bird but some sort of mammal. The question now is whether we should still believe that the animal is red. Postulate (CB) tells us that we should no longer believe that the animal is red. This can be seen by substituting ¢ = -~a = bird and # = red in Postulate (CB), instructing us to totally ignore the color observation # as if it never took place (see Example 5 in Appendix A for more details).
The reason for this behavior is that retaining the belief in the animal's color means that we are implicitly acquiring a new conditional belief --that the animal is red given that it is not a bird --which we did not have before. That is, if before observing the animal's color someone were to ask us, "Would you say that the animal is red, given that it is not a bird?" our answer would have been, "No, because we are not in possession of any color information." Strangely, according to the minimal change principle, we should maintain this same color ignorance now that the animal proved to be a non-bird. The fact that we actually observed the animal's redness prior to calling the expert does not matter, as it only pertains to our state of belief during that observation; namely, it renders the animal red, provided the animal is a bird, but says nothing about the animal's color if it turns out to be a non-bird. This is counterintuitive; once the animal is seen red, it should be presumed red no matter what ornithological classification it obtains. And if this color observation introduces new conditional beliefs, so be it.
Augmenting the AGM Postulates
We have presented a number of belief revision scenarios that involve the counterintuitive growth and shrinkage of conditional beliefs, and yet they are admitted by the AGM postulates for belief revision.
This means that the AGM postulates fail to rule out some counterintuitive belief revision operators. We have also shown that although Postulate (CB) does stabilize conditional beliefs, it also leads to counterintuitive results because it often destabilizes unconditional beliefs while protecting conditional ones.
Our solution to the problem is to divide conditional beliefs into two categories; those that may destabilize unconditional beliefs if preserved, and those that do not. We then insist that only the second category of conditional beliefs be preserved, and we do this by augmenting the AGM postulates with additional postulates. In fact, for clarity of exposition, we break down the conditional beliefs we want to preserve into four classes and propose one postulate for preserving each class.
We first present these postulates, and then discuss the reason why they do not compromise the stability of unconditional beliefs as does Postulate (CB). That these postulates correspond to four disjoint classes of conditional beliefs will be obvious from the representation theorem of these postulates, which we present later. Conditional beliefs whose protection destabilizes unconditional beliefs are the subject of Section 6.
The proposed postulates are:
(C1) Ira ~ #, then (t/,o#) oa_= ~/,oa.
Explanation: When two pieces of evidence arrive, the second being more specific than the first, the first is redundant; that is, the second evidence alone would yield the same state of belieL
Explanation: When two contradictory pieces of evidence arrive, the last one prevails; that is, the second evidence alone would yield the same state of belief.
Explanation: An evidence # should be retained after accommodating a more recent evidence a that implies p given current beliefs.
(C4) If ¢o o~ ~: ~#, then (¢o#)o~ ~= ~#.
Explanation:
No evidence can contribute to its own demise. If # is not contradicted after seeing o~, then it should remain uncontradicted when a is preceded by tt itself.
By examining the postulates carefully, we see that none of them does lead to the unnecessary discredit of evidence. In particular, according to Postulate (C1), the later evidence a could never discredit the previous evidence p because a entails #. Postulate (C2), on the other hand, permits the later evidence a to discredit the previous evidence # but justifiably so; a logically contradicts #. Postulate (C3) clearly insists that the previous evidence # be retained after accommodating the more recent evidence a. And Postulate (C4) concerns a case under which the previous evidence p should not be contradicted as a result of accommodating the more recent evidence a Postulates (C1)-(C4) were phrased in terms of iterated revisions, but following is an equivalent formulation (given Definition 1) that emphasizes their role in minimizing changes in conditional beliefs:
Explanation: Accommodating evidence # should not perturb any conditional beliefs that are conditioned on a premise more specific than #.
(C2) Ifa ~ -~#, then ¢ ~ j3[a iff g,o# ~ ~lc~.
Explanation: Accommodating evidence # should not perturb any conditional beliefs that are conditioned on a premise that contradicts #.
]0 (C3) If g, ~ #J a, then (¢o #) ~ #is.
Explanation: The conditional #Ja should not be given up after accommodating evidence #.
The conditional -~#la should not be acquired after accommodating evidence #.
Appendix A presents four AGM-compatible revision operators that contradict each of our proposed postulates, thus demonstrating that none of (C1)-(C4) is derivable from the AGM postulates. In the following section, we provide concrete real-life scenarios demonstrating the plausibility and inevitability of the proposed postulates.
Examples
Postulate (C1) I have a circuit containing an adder and a multiplier. I believe both the adder and multiplier are working, hence the circuit as a whole is working. If someone were to tell me that the circuit failed, I would blame the multiplier, not the adder (trick of the trade: multipliers are known to be more troublesome). However, if someone tells me that the adder is bad, I would believe that the multiplier is fine (after all why should a failing adder cause the multiplier to fail?). Now, they tell me the circuit is faulty, and immediately after, that the adder is bad. I am tempted to claim that the multiplier is bad too. My naive argument: "After hearing of the fault in the circuit I blamed the multiplier. Learning that the adder is bad is perfectly consistent with my current belief that the multiplier is bad, therefore, I have no reason to change my mind about the multiplier being bad." Plausible reasoning (and Postulate C1) on the other hand claim that I should change my mind because the only reason I blamed the multiplier was to explain the failing circuit. Otherwise, by my own admission, I would presume the multiplier is fine. Moreover, I also admitted that the two components do not affect each other. Hence, learning that the adder is bad perfectly explains away whatever reasons I had in blaming the multiplier; I should revert to my initial belief that the multiplier is fine. Postulate (C1) enforces this line of reasoning. In particular, by letting 
Postulate (C2)
Consider the second example in Section 2: I believe that lady X is smart and rich. Moreover, I am disposed to maintain that X is smart even if found to be poor and, conversely, that X is rich even if found to be not smart. Now, I obtain evidence that X is in fact not smart, followed by evidence that X is indeed smart. What should happen to my belief in X being rich after accommodating these pieces of evidence? Postulate (C2) forces one to maintain this belief. Specifically, by letting ¢ = smart A rich. # = ~smart, a = smart, j3 = rich, one can conclude that (¢ o #)o a ~ fi using Postulate (C2) and given that a ~ -~# and ¢ o a ~ ft. Example 2 in Appendix A, however, demonstrates that the AGM postulates are too weak to reach this conclusion.
Postulate (C3)
Consider the first example in Section 2: I believe that X is not a bird and that X does not fly. Still, in the event that X turns out a bird, I am prepared to change my mind and conclude that X flies. What should happen to this conditional belief upon observing that X can fly? Postulate (C3) forces one to maintain this conditional belief after accommodating the observation. That is, by letting ¢ = ,bird A -,flies.
# = flies, a = bird,
one can conclude that (¢ o #) o a ~ # using Postulate (C3) and given that g, o a ~ #. Example 3 in Appendix A, however, demonstrates that the AGM postulates are too weak to draw this conclusion.
Postulate (C4)
A philosopher wakes up in the morning and says: "The sun is shining, great!, I have no reason to believe that it will be a nasty day." His wife tells him: "In fact, just before you woke up they said on the radio that it is going to be a nice day." The philosopher says: "Did they really say that? They are usually right on the radio, I will have to take it back then, it is going to be nasty after all." Readers who feel there is something strange in this dialogue will be pleased to know that Postulate (C4) will weed out this sort of logic from conversation. In particular, letting
one can conclude that (¢ o #) o a ~ -7# using Postulate (C4) and given that g, o a ~ -1#. In other words, the philosopher's final statement is inconsistent with Postulate (C4). Example 4 in Appendix A, however, demonstrates that the AGM postulates are too weak to rule out such a statement.
A Representation Theorem
Katsuno and Mendelzon have shown that a revision operator satisfying the AGM postulates is equivalent to a set of total pre-orders <¢, each of which is associated with a sentence g, and is used to revise this sentence in the face of further evidence [7] . One observation about this result, however, is that the total pre-orders associated with different sentences are not related to one another except by requiring that the pre-orders be faithful. This means that the AGM postulates do not constrain the changes in conditional beliefs enough when evidence is accommodated. Postulates (C1)-(C4), on the other hand, which strongly constrain such changes, should also strongly constrain the relation between the pre-orders .<¢ and _<¢o~. This is exactly what the following theorem shows: By examining the above representation theorem, we see how each of Postulates (C1)-(C4) concerns itself with preserving some part of the pre-order _<¢ into the pre-order _<¢ou. It is also clear from the above theorem that there are two parts of the pre-order <¢ that Postulates (C1)-(C4) do not preserve into _<¢o,. Specifically, if wx _<¢ w2 (or all <¢ w2), where ~1 ~ -~# and w2 ~ #, then the postulates do not insist on ~l _<¢ou w2 (nor on 0~1 <¢o, ~2). The rationale behind this will be discussed at length in Section 6.
The Soundness of Postulates (C1)-(C4)
We will show in this section that Postulates (C1)-(C4) are sound with respect to Spohn's proposal for belief change [8, 9] , which can be viewed as a qualitative version of Jeffrey's Rule of probabilistic conditioning [5, 6] . According to this proposal, a state of befief is represented by a ranking t¢ that maps propositions into the class of ordinals such that
a(true) = O,

a(a V/3) = min(a(t~),g(/3)).
Intuitively, a represents a plausibility grading, where propositions assigned the smallest ordinals are the most plausible [4] . Furthermore, a proposition ~ is accepted by t¢ to degree J precisely when t~(-~a) = J.
Spohn provided a specific proposal for changing a state of belief t¢ such that some proposition # would become accepted to degree J. The new state of belief is denoted by x(u,j ) and is defined as follows:
This method of belief change has been called J-conditionalization in [5, 6] , and it does capture belief revision, contraction, and expansion as special cases [4] . A specialization of J-conditioning, which we will call R-conditioning, corresponds exactly to belief revision and expansion. In particular, the R-conditionalization of ~ on # (written i%) is defined as follows:
That is, if # is already accepted by to, then R-conditionalization does not lead to any belief changes. But, if # is not accepted by a, then R-conditionalization makes it accepted to degree 1. s We now have the following theorem, which shows that R-conditioning satisfies Postulates (C1)-(C4) for iterated belief revision. The statement of the theorem uses a ~ o~ as a shorthand for to(--a) > 0.
SThe reason we must deviate from the original J-conditioning proposed by Spohn is that we do not wish a revision by # to ever lower our confidence in #. J-conditioning might exhibit such behavior. For example, if ~ was already accepted by t: to degree higher than 1, then accepting It to degree 1 corresponds to lowering our confidence in g. This would be incompatible with the normal reading of the revision operator o as reflecting evidence in favor of ~ [5, 6] . 
If a~ ~ ~#, then (gu). ~ "#" |
Legitimate Changes in Conditional Beliefs
Given Theorem 2, it is not hard to see that Postulate (CB) implies, but is not equivalent to, Postulates (C1)-(C4). Therefore, Postulates (C1)-(C4) do admit some changes in conditional beliefs. What are these changes and why are they legitimate?
To answer these questions, we need to point out that Postulates (C1)-(C4) are only two postulates short from absolutely minimizing changes in conditional beliefs. The additional postulates needed for this purpose are given below:
If¢o# ~ -~a and ¢oa ~ #, then (¢o#)oa ~ #.
Explanation: If evidence # rules out the premise a, then the conditional belief #la should not be acquired after observing #.
If ¢o# ~ ~a and ¢ oa ~ ~#, then (~bo #) o a ~ -~#.
Explanation: If evidence # rules out the premise ~, then the conditional belief -~#la should not be given up after observing #.
That Postulates (C5) and (C6) attain absolute minimal change in conditional beliefs can be seen from the following representation theorem, which, together with Theorem 2, shows that the total pre-order _<¢ou is as similar to the total pre-prder <¢ as the AGM postulates permit. The remaining changes in conditional beliefs that are not eliminated by Postulates (C1)-(C4) are those identified by Postulates (C5)-(C6). The first of these changes is acquiring a conditional belief #] a only because evidence # was acquired. And the second of these changes is giving up a conditional belief -p]a only because evidence # was acquired. Postulates (C5)-(C6), and also Postulate (CB), eliminate these changes, but the following analysis shows that such elimination is premature.
To show that the change eliminated by Postulate (C5) could be legitimate, consider the story of the red-bird, which was presented earlier as counterexample to Postulate (CB). This example is a clear cut contradiction with Postulate (C5) because it shows that the revision suggested by Postulate (C5) is wrong: All we believe initially is that X is a bird. We then observe that X is red, followed by an observation that X is not a bird. Postulate (C5) tells us that we should dismiss the observation of X's color in this case. That is, since the conditional red[~bird was not believed by the state of belief bird, it should neither be believed by the new state of belief bird o red. But this falsely means that when -~bircl is observed, red must be retracted, which is a counterintuitive behavior.
To show that Postulate (C6) prohibits some legitimate changes in conditional beliefs, suppose that we face a murder trial with two main suspects, John and Mary. Initially, it appears that the murder was committed by one person, hence, we believe that
g, = (John A -Mary) V (-John h Mary).
Given the AGM postulates, we also believe in the two conditionals -~Mary I John and ~John I Mary. As the trial unfolds, however, we receive a very reliable testimony incriminating John, followed by another reliable testimony incriminating Mary. At this point, it is only reasonable to believe that both suspects took part in the murder, thus dismissing the one-person theory together with the two conditional beliefs -~MarylJohn and -~John[Mary. Postulate (C6) , on the other hand, will force us to maintain the two conditionals and dismiss the testimony against John, no matter how reliable and compelling. That is, by This is counterintuitive; whether we should dismiss the testimony against John should depend on how strongly we believe in it and on how strongly we believe in the one-person theory. Postulate (C6), however, does not take these factors into consideration and always prefers the conditional belief over the unconditional one.
Future Work
The counterexamples to Postulates (C5) and (C6) that we discussed in Section 6 show that the outcome of belief change depends on the strength of evidence triggering the change. The language of AGM, however, is too weak to represent evidence strength and is therefore inappropriate for phrasing some plausible properties of belief change, such as weaker versions of Postulates (C5) and (C6).
To remedy this inexpressiveness, we are now investigating the refinement of revision operators so that one can express the strength of evidence with which one is revising beliefs [3] . In particular, instead of one revision operator o, we are proposing a sequence of revision operators o0, ol,o2,..., where g, o L # denotes the revision of ¢ with evidence It having strength L. 6 The notion of evidence strength leads us to another important notion: degree of acceptance. Specifically, we will say that proposition # is accepted by g, to degree J if it takes an evidence ~it with strength J to retract It from ¢. Formally, we have the following definition. 
g, oj-~# ~: -~it; and 3. ¢ oj --it V= ~"
This refinement to the AGM language has been allowing us to express weakened versions of Postulate (C5) and (C6) by taking into account the degrees to which conditionals are accepted and the strength of competing evidence. Moreover, the refined language has been allowing us to express stronger versions 6The revision operators can be partially ordered in general, but we have been mainly focusing on operators that are totally ordered.
of Postulates (C1)-(C4) that insist on the selective preservation of not only conditional beliefs, but also their degrees of acceptance.
The most interesting outcomes of this line of inquiry have been 1. A representation theorem of the new postulates, which suggests that an epistemic state is comprised not only of a total pre-order <¢ on possible worlds, but also of a total pre-order C¢ on distances between worlds. That is, (wl,w2) E¢ (w3,w4) precisely when the distance from world wl to world 7 w2 is no greater than the distance from world w3 to world Wa.
2. The pre-order C¢ amounts to an entrenchment order on conditional beliefs, as opposed to the pre-order <¢, which amounts to an entrenchment order on unconditional beliefs. Specifically, the distance from a minimal world in Mods(c~ A fl) to a minimal world in Mocls(c~ A -~/3) is the degree to which the conditional fl I a is entrenched.
3. The pre-order E¢ contains the information necessary for resolving conflicts such as those discussed in Section 6 because it permits one to compare the degree to which a conditional (e.g., -~John I Mary) is entrenched to the strength of competing evidence (e.g., John then Mary), before making a decision on whether to give up the evidence John or the conditional ~John I Mary.
Conclusion
We have demonstrated that adequate preservation of conditional beliefs is a necessary component in any account of rational belief revision, and that the AGM postulates are too weak to regulate such preservation. Moreover, we have shown that full, indiscriminate preservation of conditional beliefs leads to counterintuitive results because it comes at the expense of destabilizing unconditional beliefs. Accordingly, we have strengthened the AGM postulates by four additional postulates that preserve the proper mix of conditional and unconditional beliefs, thus providing a new criterion for testing the coherence of iterated belief revision. Finally, we extended the Katsuno and Mendelzon representation theorem to cover the newly proposed postulates.
A Concrete Examples
We will represent a total pre-order _<¢ by a mapping ~ from worlds to positive integers, where Wl _<¢ w2 precisely when s~(Wl) < to(w2) . Consider the AGM revision operator given partially in We have, Table 3 : An AGM-compatible operator contradicting Postulate (C3).
Consider the AGM revision operator given partially in Table 3 . Let Consider the AGM revision operator given partially in Table 4 . Let
We have,
¢ = -~shining_sun, tt = nice_day, a = s h i n i n g _ s u n . ~b o o~ ~_ s h i n i n g _ s u n , ( ¢ o it) o a ~ s h i n i n g _ s u n A ~n i e e _ d a y .
That is, although., o a ~ ~it, we have (¢ o it) o a ~ -~#, thus violating Postulate (C4). Moreover, Wa ~ #, w2 ~ -~it, wl <¢ w2, yet Wa ~¢o~ w2, thus violating Condition (CR4). Given our assumption, this reduces to
Example 5 [Postulate (CB)]
which is a counterintuitive conclusion.
B P r o o f s
It is useful in the following proofs to notice that wl :~¢ w2 is equivalent to wl >¢ ~'2. 
